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ANOTHER DAY COMES-MISAPPROPRIATION AS AN
ALTERNATE BASIS FOR SECTION 10(b) LIABILITY
Securities Exchange Commission v. Materia
745 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985)
HAL MORRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Fraud in the financial markets is not a uniquely contemporary prob-
lem. t However, a recent rash2 of highly visible and allegedly fraudulent
transactions based on material, non-public information, have served to
capture and focus the attention of the Securities Exchange Commission
(S.E.C.) on this problem.3 Basing its activities primarily upon the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,4 the S.E.C. is utilizing the broad anti-fraud
provisions of Section 10(b) 5 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder6 to
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1. Note, An Outsider Who Misappropriates Confidential Information May be Charged with
Securities Fraud: United States v. Newman, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 849 (1982).
2. Block & Prussin, Outsider Duties in Insider Trading, in S.E.C. '82, vol. X § VIII at 215 (H.
Schlagman & N. Hirsh ed. 1982).
3. See infra note 7.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
5. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982), provides in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
6. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility of any national secur-
ity exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
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combat the trading of securities based on material non-public informa-
tion. Though the magnitude of trading of this type is impossible to deter-
mine, the S.E.C. is undertaking a vigorous enforcement program against
what it believes to be a serious problem.7
Until recently, if the S.E.C. hoped to be successful in prosecuting
this type of enforcement action, it had to meet the stringently applied
elements of a Section 10(b) action.8 Traditionally, the courts required
proof of a special relationship affording access to confidential non-public
information before they would place sanctions on persons engaging in
this type of trading. 9 However, in several recent cases, the S.E.C. has
successfully brought enforcement actions based upon an alternate theory
of fraud, which does not require a showing of a special relationship as a
condition precedent to liability.' 0 These so-called "outsider trading"
cases are founded on the theory of "misappropriation."" This article
seeks to explore, in the context of the Second Circuit case of S.EC.v.
Materia, 12 this novel and emerging theory of securities fraud. In the con-
text of this article, the roots of this theory are explored. In addition,
because the Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari to a misappropria-
tion case,13 this article endeavors to predict the possible outcome of any
eventual Supreme Court review.
7. John M. Fedders, director SEC Enforcement Division, noted in Remarks To Fall Meeting
of the Association of General Counsel (Washington, D.C. October 8, 1981), that:
The Commission remains deeply concerned about trading by persons in possession of mate-
rial non-public information. The Commission has brought over 40 cases in this area since
January 1978. This is more insider trading cases than it brought from 1934 to 1978. Yet,
more can and will be done in this area.
[T]here remains widespread abuse of material non-public information... We will not shy
away from cases based on circumstantial evidence if the relevant facts demonstrate that
any person breached a trust, confidence or other duty owed to another person by effecting
trades while in possession of inside information.
Quoted in Fourteenth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, vol. 2, 373 (1982).
8. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) reh. denied 425 U.S. 986 (1976)
(Proof of Scienter); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2nd Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (In connection with a purchase or sale of security); see generally 5
Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lob-5 §§ 36-38 (1984) for a discussion of the elements of
a Section 10(b) action.
9. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see also infra notes 25-30 and accom-
panying text.
10. See e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (1981), affd after remand, 722 F.2d 729
(2nd Cir. 1983) (Unpublished Order), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
11. Koeltl & Kubek, Chiarella and Market Information, REV. OF SEC. REG., June 18, 1980
(Discusses liability of non-insiders.).
12. 745 F.2d 197 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985).
13. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court never reached the merits of the
issue of misappropriation because it was not submitted to the jury by the trial court. In United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1981), affd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2nd Cir. 1983),
certiorari was denied. See supra note 10.
S.EC. v. MATERIA
II. BACKGROUND
FROM 1934 To CADY, ROBERTS
Both the Securities Act of 193314 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934' 5 were enacted in the wake of the Great Depression. The na-
tion's financial markets were still reeling from the stock market crash of
1929. 16 The foremost purpose of these two monumental pieces of New
Deal legislation was to restore lost investor confidence in the depression
ravaged financial markets and foster capital formation.' 7 As a part of
these Acts, and in support of their purpose, Congress provided a plethora
of civil and criminal liabilities. t8
Of particular importance are the liabilities included in Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act.19 This section and Rule lOb-5, 20 which the S.E.C.
promulgated thereunder, 2' are the primary anti-fraud provisions of the
1934 Act. These anti-fraud provisions are the cornerstones of the
S.E.C.'s enforcement program to combat fraudulent trading.2 2 Though
the courts have traditionally applied these provisions very broadly,23 so
as to achieve an overall remedial purpose to the securities laws,24 it was
not until the S.E.C.'s administrative decision of In re Cady, Roberts &
Co.25 that a general "abstain from trading or disclose" rule was expressly
applied to non-corporate insiders.
In Cady, Roberts, the S.E.C. found a broker liable under Section
10(b) for trades he made based on material non-public information ac-
quired from a corporate director. The S.E.C. found that the broker had a
duty to either abstain from trading on such information or to disclose the
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
16. See generally Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 29 (1959).
17. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1933). Accord President Roosevelt's Message to Congress, of March 29, 1933, in which he stated
that the 1933 Act "adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine 'let the seller also
beware.'" H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
18. See e.g., 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h, 77k, 771, 77s, 77t (1982); 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i,
78j, 78u (1982).
19. See supra note 5.
20. See supra note 6.
21. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982) the S.E.C. is specifically given the "power to
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of
this chapter..."
22. Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 940 (1970).
23. Note, Securities Regulation-Retributive or Remedial: What is the Objective of Imposing
Criminal Sanctions in Section 10(b) Actions Under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act? 8 J. CORP.
LAW 527, 529 (1983).
24. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 387 U.S. 941 (1967).
25. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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information. 26 This duty, the S.E.C. reasoned, was based on two factors:
1) "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information;" 27 and 2) "the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."'28 This
duty, to abstain or disclose, was a correlative duty based upon the exist-
ence of a special relationship. It was this special relationship that re-
sulted in the trading broker's vicarious liability under Section 10(b). 2 9 In
support of its decision to find liability, the S.E.C. noted, that "[a] signifi-
cant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use
of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of
corporate office." 30
After Cady, Roberts, the Second Circuit gave judicial recognition to
the Cady, Roberts' reasoning in the case of SE.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur.31  In Texas Gulf Sulphur, several officers and employees
purchased stock of that company without disclosing their knowledge of
material non-public information regarding recent mineral finds. The Sec-
ond Circuit found these officers and employees guilty under Section
10(b). 32 However, the court focused its attention primarily on the fair-
ness element of the Cady, Roberts test. 33 In its now famous dicta, the
court created an expanded interpretation of Cady, Roberts when it stated
that "anyone in possession of material inside information.., must either
disclose it to the investing public or ... abstain from trading. ' 34 Based
on this reasoning, Texas Gulf Sulphur's dicta indicated that any trading
based on material non-public information would be fraudulent. Under
the reasoning of Texas Gulf Sulphur, mere possession of material non-
public information, even absent a special relationship, would trigger the
Cady, Roberts "abstain or disclose rule. " Application of this broadened
"abstain or disclose rule" has been invoked in numerous situations, includ-
ing cases against underwriters,35  attorneys,36  accountants,37  and
26. Id. at 912.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The S.E.C. noted that the issue in Cady, Roberts was "to identify those persons who are in a
special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs and thereby suffer correlative
duties in trading in its securities." Id.
30. Id. at 912, n.15.
31. 401 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. S.E.C., 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
32. Id. at 864.
33. Id. at 848.
34. Id.
35. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2nd Cir. 1974).
36. United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
S. E C v. MATERIA
reporters. 38
POST CADY, ROBERTS
Even after the decisions in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf, there was
a marked reluctance by the courts to apply the broadened abstain or dis-
close rule to non-insiders. However, Chiarella v. United States,39 a crimi-
nal securities fraud case, attempted to change this judicial reluctance.
The defendant in Chiarella was a mark-up man who worked for a finan-
cial printer. As a part of his job, Chiarella proofread documents used for
tender offers. Though his employer attempted to conceal the names and
identities of the companies involved, Chiarella was able to discern the
identities of five takeover targets. On the basis of this information, and
without disclosing this information, Chiarella purchased on the open
market stock of each of these target companies. He then sold these
shares, at a substantial profit, immediately after public announcements of
the tender offers were made. Based on these activities, the government
brought suit against Chiarella alleging criminal violations of Section
10(b) and Rule l0b-5.4°
At trial, Chiarella was convicted. 41 The Second Circuit upheld the
conviction, holding that "[a]nyone--corporate insider or not-who regu-
larly receives material non-public information may not use that informa-
tion to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to
disclose. ' '42 In essence, the Second Circuit reiterated its support for
Texas Gulf by noting that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 required equal
access to information before one can trade on such information. 43
However, Chiarella's conviction was reversed by the Supreme
Court.4 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, began the Court's anal-
ysis with a discussion of Cady, Roberts. Justice Powell explicitly upheld
the Cady, Roberts decision when he stated that a failure to disclose non-
public information is only actionable under Section 10(b) when one has a
duty to disclose and breaches that duty.45
Moreover, according to the Court, this duty to disclose only arises
37. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified 540 F.2d 27 (1976).
38. United States v. Winans, 17 Sec. Reg. and Law Rep. (BNA) 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
39. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
40. Mr. Chiarella was named, during January of 1978, in a 17 count indictment alleging crimi-
nal violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 225.
41. U.S. v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. U.S. v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2nd Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 1362.
44. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
45. Id. at 229-30.
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when a special relationship of trust and confidence exists. 46 The Court
concluded that no duty arose from Chiarella's relationship with the sell-
ers. Through this holding, the Court rejected the Second Circuit's equal
access test.47 In rejecting that test, the Court commented that not every
unfair transaction gives rise to liability under Section 10(b). 48 Further-
more, Chiarella's failure to disclose was not fraudulent because he had no
duty to speak.49 Justice Powell concluded the majority opinion by re-
jecting the Second Circuit's dicta in Texas Gulf when he stated that:
"When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be
no fraud absent a duty to speak. [Therefore] [w]e hold that a duty to
disclose under Section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information." 50 Through this holding, the Court
clearly rejected a rule of liability based on parity of information.
The government, however, on appeal offered an alternate theory
under which Chiarella's conviction could be affirmed. 51 The government
argued that Chiarella breached a duty to the acquiring corporations
when he bought and sold securities based on information obtained by
virtue of his position with a printer hired by those corporations. 52 How-
ever, the Court never reached the merits of this argument because it
stated that it "cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory
not presented to the jury."' 53 The court refused to speculate as to the
efficacy of this alternate theory. Accordingly, Justice Stevens, in his con-
curring opinion, commented that "the Court wisely leaves the resolution
of this issue for another day."'54
Chief Justice Burger, in a strongly worded dissenting opinion, ar-
gued that the strict requirements of a fiduciary or special relationship
"should give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not by
superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful
46. Id. at 230. Justice Powell stated that "liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Id.
47. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
48. 445 U.S. at 232. The court observed that "not every instance of financial unfairness consti-
tutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)."
49. The Court noted that:
the element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this case.
No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target company's
securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was
not a fiduciary, he was not a person with whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions. Id. at 232-33.
50. Id. at 235.
51. Respondent's Brief at 16, Chiarella.
52. 445 U.S. at 235.
53. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J. concurring).
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means."' 55 Relying on the tort duty to disclose illegally acquired infor-
mation, the Chief Justice reasoned that a person who misappropriated
material, non-public information, has an absolute duty to abstain or dis-
close, even in the absence of a special relationship.5 6 The Chief Justice
concluded that Chiarella "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly...
[and] then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by purchasing
securities in the market."
5 7
Scarcely seven months passed when the Chief Justice's reasoning in
Chiarella was adopted by the Second Circuit. In United States v. New-
man,58 the Second Circuit reversed a district court's holding that there
could be no Section 10(b) liability because a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the defendants and those with whom they traded did not exist.59
The Second circuit reasoned that the government was able to avoid the
problems of Chiarella, i.e., proving a special relationship, by alleging in-
stead that the two broker-defendants breached a duty to their employ-
ers.6° The court then accepted the reasoning of Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Chiarella,6 1 and held that "deceitful misappropriation of confi-
dential information by a fiduciary ... consistently [has] been held to be
unlawful."' 62 In addition, the court noted that proof of a criminal viola-
tion of Section 10(b) is manifestly different from proof of a private ac-
tion.63 As a consequence, the traditional need to prove a transaction "in
connection" 64 with the "purchase or sale" 65 of a security was relaxed.
Instead, the court explained that the defendants "[b]y sullying the repu-
55. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 245. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined the Chief Justice in his dissenting opin-
ion and commented that "[we] do not agree that a failure to disclose violates the Rule only when the
responsibilities of a relationship of that kind have been breached." Id. at 247 (Marshall and Black-
mun, J.J. dissenting).
58. 664 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1981), aff'd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2nd Cir. 1983) (Unpublished
order), cert. denied, 464 U.S., 863 (1983).
59. In Newman, two stock brokers misappropriated confidential information regarding mergers
and takeovers, and conveyed this information to a trader in another brokerage firm who then passed
the information on to foreign nationals. These foreign nationals used the information to purchase
and sell stock in the target companies, sharing the resulting profits with everyone involved in the
scheme.
60. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
61. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (Burger, C.J. and Marshall and Blackmun,
J.J. dissenting).
62. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
63. Id. at 17.
64. The court applied the flexible standard of Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), in which the Supreme Court construed the language "in connection with"
flexibly to include practices merely "touching" the purchase or sale of securities. See also Newman,
664 F.2d at 18.
65. The court noted that the defendants "sole purpose in participating in the misappropriation
of confidential takeover information was to purchase shares." 664 F.2d at 18.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
tations of [their employers] as safe repositories of client confidences ...
defrauded those employers as surely as if they took their money."' 66
III. S.E.C v. MATERIA
FACTS
It was in the foregoing historical context that S.E. C v. Materia was
decided. Anthony Materia was employed as a proofreader by the finan-
cial printing firm of Bowne of New York, Inc. Bowne specialized in
printing the numerous documents used in connection with proposed
takeover offers. In an effort to protect against the disclosure of the iden-
tity of potential target companies, code names, blanks and even actual
misstatements were included in early drafts of these documents. In addi-
tion to Bowne's intense efforts to protect the identities of takeover
targets, Bowne also "had a policy explicitly forbidding its employees
from trading on information they might come across in the course of
their work."'67
Despite these efforts to keep the identity of potential takeover
targets secret, between December, 1980 and September, 1982, Materia
discovered the true identity of four such targets. Materia purchased
stock in these companies within hours of his discoveries, selling his hold-
ings, at substantial profit, after the takeovers were made public.
Shortly after his fourth purchase and sale, the S.E.C. filed a civil
enforcement action against Materia. The S.E.C.'s action was based on
alleged violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and violations of Sec-
tion 14(e) of the Exchange Act68 and Rule 14e-3 promulgated thereun-
der.69 The S.E.C. based the Section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5 claims on
Materia's allegedly "misappropriating material, non-public information
about the proposed acquisition of the securities of specific issuers from
Bowne's clients, in breach of his fiduciary duty to Bowne and its clients
arising out of his employment relationship and the express internal policy
against purchasing securities on the basis of client information." '70
DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The S.E.C.'s case against Materia was heard before District Court
66. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
67. 745 F.2d at 199 n. 1 ("Written statements of this prohibition were posted conspicuously in
Bowne's plant, and copies were distributed to all employees.").
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1983).
70. S.E.C. v. Materia, [1983-84] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,526 at 97,025 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 1983).
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Judge Brieant in a fourteen day non-jury trial. 71 Judge Brieant explicitly
found that Materia misappropriated information from his employer and
traded on that information to his advantage. 72 Furthermore, the court
found that "Materia had actual knowledge . . . and acted with scien-
ter.' ' 73 In addition, the court held that these trades were a direct breach
of Materia's fiduciary duty to his employer and his employer's clients. 74
As a result, Materia was found to have violated Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. 75 The court then entered a permanent injunction against Materia
and ordered him to disgorge $99,862.50 in profits from the four fraudu-
lent purchases and sales. 76
SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION
The Second Circuit, Judge Kaufman, writing for the court, affirmed
the district court's decision. The Second Circuit explicitly adopted the
alternate theory of Section 10(b) liability that the Supreme Court never
reached in Chiarella.77 The court in affirming the district court's deci-
sion reaffirmed its earlier holding in Newman and stated that "one who
mis-appropriates non-public information in breach of a fiduciary duty
and trades on that information to his own advantage violates Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5.' 78
MATERIA'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
In his petition for certiorari, Materia contended that the Second Cir-
cuit incorrectly resolved the issue, of misappropriation as a form of Sec-
tion 10(b) liability, left open by Chiarella.79 Materia argued that the
Second Circuit's decision improperly "federalizes" breaches of fiduciary
duty. He questioned whether Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability is
properly based on the use of non-public information when there is no
71. S.E.C. v. Materia, [1983-84] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 99,583 at 97,272 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
5, 1983).
72. Id. at 97,276.
73. 745 F.2d at 200. See e.g., Materia, [1983-84] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,583 at 99,284
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1983).
74. Id. at 97,281.
75. Id. at 97,281-82. The District Court also found Materia guilty of violating Section 14e and
Rule 14(e)(3). However, Materia's violations of these latter provisions are beyond the scope of this
article.
76. Materia, [1984] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,681 at 99,447 (2d Cir. 1984). In addition
Materia was sentenced to five months in jail, four years probation, and 100 hours of service per year
of probation. 17 SEC. REG. L. REP. [BNA] 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
77. 745 F.2d at 203.
78. 745 F.2d at 203.
79. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issue of misappropria-
tion which was left open in Chiarella.
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allegation of a duty to disclose to the purchaser or seller on the other side
of the transaction.80
IV. SECOND CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN S.E.C. V. MA TERIA
The issue before the Second Circuit in Materia was a very narrow
one. Materia did not "contest the district court's finding that he misap-
propriated confidential information and traded on it to his advantage.""1
Instead, he based his entire appeal on a narrow question of law. Materia
simply argued that the activity which the district court found he engaged
in "does not contravene Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ''8 2 In addressing
this issue of law, the court noted that Materia's argument directly con-
troverted its earlier decision in United States v. Newman,8 3 and that the
misappropriation of confidential information and the subsequent trading
on it "lie[s] within the proscriptive purview of the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws."'8 4 The court felt that the factual similarity to New-
man permitted it to affirm solely on the precedential authority of that
case."5 Nevertheless, the court noted that "to delineate the contours of
what may still be perceived as a novel theory of liability under the an-
tifraud provisions, we choose, however, to elucidate the bases for our
holding."'86
In support of its holding that Materia's misappropriation of material
non-public information gives rise to a Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 viola-
tion, the court turned to the express language of Rule lOb-5.8 7 The court
viewed Rule lOb-5 as embodying three distinct concepts: 1) "fraud or
deceit"; 2) "upon any person"; and 3) "in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security." Turning first to the "fraud or deceit" concept, the
court was able to easily8 8 find that Materia's conduct fell "squarely
within the 'fraud or deceit' language of the Rule."'8 9 In reaching this
conclusion, the court explicitly relied on Chief Justice Burger's reasoning
in Chiarella.90 In addition, the Second Circuit reasoned that the original
statutory intent behind Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was that the appli-
80. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 73,014. Materia also sought review of the validity of
Rule 14e-3.
81. 745 F.2d at 201.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
84. 745 F.2d at 201.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The language of Rule 10b-5 is quoted supra at note 6.
88. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
89. 745 F.2d at 201.
90. Id. (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J. dissenting)).
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cation of these anti-fraud provisions should be broad in scope.9 Relying
on the legislative history of the 1934 Act, the court noted that it is "clear
that the antifraud provisions . . .[were] intended to be broad in scope,
encompassing all manipulative and deceptive practices which have been
demonstrated to fulfill no useful function. ' 92 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the scope of Section 10(b) extended beyond corporate insid-
ers. Applying this expanded reading of fraud to the facts of this case, the
court concluded that Materia's "misappropriation of material nonpublic
information ... perpetrated a fraud upon Bowne," his employer.
93
Despite finding that Materia's actions were fraudulent, the court
recognized that the mere possession of inside information, absent a duty
to disclose, does not engender Section 10(b) liability.94 Instead, the court
observed that Section 10(b) is both a civil and criminal piece of legisla-
tion. However, when the S.E.C. adopted Rule lOb-5 there was no ex-
plicit mention of private civil remedies. It was only after the judiciary's
creation of a private Section 10(b) action that the question of standing
arose.95 As a result, in the context of a government enforcement action,
the focus is on the scope of the Section's prescriptions rather than the
precise direction of a duty.96 As a consequence, the court found
Materia's reliance on Chiarella to be misplaced. Chiarella only decided
that mere possession alone does not create a duty to disclose.9 7 However,
in Newman the court decided that "one who misappropriates non-public
information in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on that information
to his own advantage, violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."' 98 There-
fore, Materia's fraudulent activities relative to his employer were found
to satisfy the "upon any person" language of the section.99
91. 745 F.2d at 201. Accord Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
("Designed to protect against deceitful conduct in investment practices...").
92. Materia, 745 F.2d at 201 (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)).
93. 745 F.2d at 202. The court also noted that one of Bowne's most important assets, as a
financial printer, "is its reputation as a safe repository for client secrets."
94. This issue was decided in Chiarela See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
95. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Discussing standing require-
ment of purchaser or seller).
96. 745 F.2d at 202.
97. Id. at 203, where the court stated that "mere possession of confidential information is insuf-
ficient to create a duty to disclose ... to those on the other side of the market." Accord Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 235.
98. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16-18. See also Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
99. The court also found that Materia's reliance on the earlier case of Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub noma., Moss v. Newman, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984),
was misplaced. The court reasoned that Moss was strictly limited to cases of civil liability. That case
held that absent a duty to disclose, no civil liability could result. Consequently, the court concluded
that Moss was clearly not relevant to whether Rule 10b-5 was contravened in a criminal case or a
governmental action. Moss only bears on private suits. See, 745 F.2d at 203.
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Finally, the court faced the question of whether Materia's fraud was
"in connection with the purchase or sale of securities." Basing its rea-
soning on the facts, the court was able to conclude that the fraud on
Bowne was undertaken merely to reap profits from the purchase and sale
of securities of target companies. o Moreover, the court observed that
the legislative purpose of the 1934 Act was to prevent such actions.101 In
fact, in affirming the lower court's decision, the Second Circuit noted
that it could not believe Materia's contention that Section 10(b) did not
cover such acts, 0 2 because it was impossible to believe that "the drafters
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934--envisaging as they did an open
and honest market-would have countenanced the activities engaged in
by Anthony Materia."' 0 3
V. ANALYSIS OF S.E.. V. MA TERIA
What separates Materia from previous cases alleging misappropria-
tion as an actionable Section 10(b) violation is the certainty with which
the court was able to find liability. 0 4 Basing its decision on Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Chiarella and its prior reasoning enunciated in New-
man, the Second Circuit gave resounding support to the S.E.C.'s enforce-
ment program against trading on material, ill-gotten, non-public
information. On several levels the result reached in Materia is
appropriate.
The very enactment of the Federal Securities laws was designed to
protect investors against deceitful conduct. °5 Although this protection
was never intended to be absolute, the securities laws have always been
interpreted to serve a remedial purpose. 10 6 Securities trading is not on
the same plane as "buying a used car," tricks, chicanery and the like are
100. 745 F.2d at 203.
101. Id. at 201 where the court noted that the "[legislative history to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 makes clear that the anti-fraud provision was intended to be broad in scope, encompass-
ing all [manipulations]." (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., (2d Sess. 6 (1934)).
102. It is important to note that Materia's sole argument on appeal is that Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not cover the acts which he was accused of doing. See supra notes 81-86 and accom-
panying text.
103. 745 F.2d at 203-4.
104. Cf. S.E.C. v. Mussella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Law firm office manager dis-
closed non-public information). The court noted that the "commonsensical view that trading on the
basis of improperly obtained information is fundamentally unfair, and that distinctions premised on
the source of the information undermine the prophylactic intent of the securities laws." Id. at 438.);
S.E.C. v. Lund, [1981-82] FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 98,428 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1982); S.E.C. v. Primar
Typographers, Inc., [1976-77] FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1976); S.E.C. v. Sorg
Printing Co., [1974-75] FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,767 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1974) (summary of S.E.C.
Complaint).
105. Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
106. See generally, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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not to be countenanced. Congress was not attempting to "take away
from the citizen [who trades securities] 'his inalienable right to make a
fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a
fool of him."'10 7 Commenting indirectly on this underlying purpose,
Chief Justice Burger noted a qualitative distinction between trading on
an informational advantage based on superior experience, foresight or
industry and trading on an informational advantage based on ill-gotten
gains.' 08 It is this very distinction that the Materia court attempted to
retain. Mere possession of information or possession based on the admi-
rable qualities enunciated by the Chief Justice are not to be seen as en-
gendering liability. However, the socially reprehensible qualities behind
trading based on misappropriated information are to be proscribed. In
short, Materia represents a reaffirmation of the principles underlying
both the Securities Act of 1934 and ethical business practices.
Furthermore, the court's reliance on a distinction between private
and governmental actions is well founded. Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, the S.E.C. is expressly authorized to enjoin violations
of the Act.109 In contradistinction, private enforcement actions were a
creation of the judiciary. 0 In an effort to circumscribe these latter ac-
tions, the standing requirement of "purchaser and seller" was devel-
oped."'I Arguably this standing requirement was applied to private
actions so as to reduce vexatious litigation of speculative injuries. 11 2
However, the express language of the Act should govern the requisites to
governmental enforcement actions. The authority for governmental ac-
tions is based not on judicial pronouncement, but on the statute itself," l3
and the statute does not contain the limiting language of purchaser or
seller. As a result, to meet the often cited remedial goals of the Act, the
Materia court correctly refused to impose the limitation, of purchaser or
seller, on an S.E.C. governmental enforcement action.
In his petition for certiorari, Materia questioned the Second Cir-
cuit's conclusion on the ground that the decision "federalizes" breaches
107. 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 128 (2d ed. 1961).
108. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982) provides in relevant part:
Wherever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter ... it
may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court....
110. The first case recognizing a private civil right of action under Section 10(b) was Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
111. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
112. Note, Rule lOb-5 Developments-Theories of Liability, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 979
(1982).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). See supra note 109.
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of duties traditionally relegated to state law. It is true that Materia estab-
lished a principle of analysis that may resemble a state common law
claim. The case established that one who misappropriates material non-
public information, and trades based on it, may be liable even if he owed
no duty to the participant on the other side of the trade. However, the
case expressly conditioned liability on the existence of a duty between the
misappropriator and the entity from whom the information was misap-
propriated. Facially this conclusion seems to be rooted in the law of
agency. 11 4 However, at common law, the breach of an agency or fiduci-
ary relationship is only actionable by the one whose trust is breached. If
left to agency law, Materia's misappropriation would only be actionable
by Bowne, his employer, the one to whom he owed his duty. In contrast,
by permitting such a breach of duty to engender Section 10(b) liability,
the court implicitly permitted those outside the agency or fiduciary rela-
tionship to prosecute these cases. Specifically, such a decision permits
the S.E.C. to act in accordance with its legislative mission to oversee
securities trading and to place sanctions on this type of activity. If left to
agency law the S.E.C. would be powerless to act."15
In essence what the Materia court did was to accept the "common-
sensical view that trading on the basis of improperly obtained informa-
tion is fundamentally unfair."' "16  This fundamental unfairness was
recognized over fifty years ago by Judge Cardozo, when he observed that
"[m]any forms of conduct permissible, in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.""11 7
In a similar fashion, because Materia was bound by ties to Bowne, his
trading on information misappropriated from Bowne was unfair and
should be forbidden. However, the same information, if received from
outside of this relationship with Bowne, and not misappropriated, should
not and does not engender the same ill-gotten flavor. Because he misap-
propriated from one he owed a duty, Materia was little more than "a
trafficker in stolen goods." ' 1 8 As the Second Circuit had earlier observed
in Newman,
[i]n other areas of the law, deceitful misappropriation of confidential
information by a fiduciary, whether described as theft, conversion, or
114. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY 395, which states:
an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or communicate information confi-
dentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account
of his agency ...
115. The decision also has the ancilliary benefit of keeping such actions in federal court thereby
encouraging uniform results, rather than state specific solutions.
116. S.E.C. v. Mussella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
117. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
118. 578 F. Supp. at 442.
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breach of trust, has consistently been held to be unlawful. [Therefore,
one] would have had to be most ingenuous to believe that Congress
intended to establish a less rigorous code of conduct under the Securi-
ties Acts.' 19
Consequently, the decision in Materia, as a matter of public policy, is
commendable.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
On December 27, 1984, Materia petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari.120 Although the Court denied Materia's petition, in
light of the separate opinions in Chiarella and the language contained in
Dirks v. S.E. C.,1 21 there is compelling evidence that a majority of the
Court would embrace the misappropriation theory.
In Chiarella, Justice Stevens gave implicit approval to the misappro-
priation theory of liability when he noted that respectable arguments
could be made in support of its approval as a theory of Section 10(b)
liability.122 In addition, Justice Brennan commented that he was unable
to subscribe to the Chiarella majority's position that there can be no Sec-
tion 10(b) liability without a breach of some duty arising from a fiduciary
relationship between the buyer and seller of securities. 23 This statement
by Justice Brennan is indicative of his reluctance to limit Section 10(b) to
situations where there is an indentifiable Cady, Roberts duty. Instead, a
broader application of Section 10(b) is warranted. This search for a
broader application is to be found in the misappropriation theory.
Clearly, Chief Justice Burger, whose reasoning the Materia and
Newman decisions are based on, would approve the theory.' 24 In addi-
tion, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, who joined in a separate concur-
ring dissent in Chiarella, would find a basis for liability in the
misappropriation theory. Their displeasure with the limited scope of the
Chiarella majority's holding was evidenced when they commented that
they did not agree with the majority's holding that "a failure to disclose
violates . . .Rule [10(b)] only when the responsibilities of a [fiduciary]
relationship have been breached."' 125 Furthermore, though reversing
Chiarella's conviction, the Chiarella majority never expressly rejected the
119. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-18.
120. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
121. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
122. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J. concurring).
123. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J. concurring).
124. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text regarding a discussion of Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent.
125. 445 U.S. at 247 (Marshall and Blackmun, J. J. dissenting).
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misappropriation theory. As a result, five justices, 126 at a minimum,
have expressed some level of support for the theory and the remaining
four justices left open the door to consider the theory.
In Dirks v. S.E.C., the Court addressed the extent to which Section
10(b) would be applied to tippers and tippees of material, non-public in-
formation.1 27 In that case, the S.E.C. argued that Dirks, as a tippee,
inherited the obligation not to trade on non-public information when he
acquired the information from the corporate insider, a tipper. The Court
held that a tippee's duty is derivative and his actions are only actionable
when "there has been a breach of duty by the insider, [the tipper].' 28
Moreover, the test for whether the insider-tipper has breached this duty
is "whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from
his disclosure. 1' 29 The Court concluded that because the tipper received
no such benefit, Dirks' actions did not constitute a Section 10(b)
violation.
However, prior to making this finding, the court found it necessary
to explicitly rule out liability based on misappropriation. The Court
commented that "Dirks [did not] misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information" at issue.1 30 This statement by the Court seems to indicate
at least an implicit recognition that misappropriation can form the basis
of a Section 10(b) violation. This recognition comes despite the fact that
the Court has neither heard a misappropriation case nor expressly recog-
nized misappropriation as being an actionable Section 10(b) act. Conse-
quently, based on this recognition and that of the separate opinions of
Chiarella, there is convincing evidence that the current Court if
presented with the appropriate case would approve the theory of misap-
propriation as an alternate basis of liability under Section 10(b).
126. Burger, C.J., Stevens, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.
127. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The Dirks' case concerned the liability of a broker-dealer specializing
in investment analysis. Raymond Dirks received information from a corporate insider regarding the
overstatement of the assets of Equity Funding of America. He investigated this information and
determined its validity. Throughout his investigation he openly discussed his findings, even going so
far as to suggest to the Wall Street Journal that it write a story on Equity Funding's asset overstate-
ment. Based on Dirks' findings, several of his clients sold their holdings in Equity Funding. Later
the New York Stock Exchange and the California Insurance Commission conducted their own in-
vestigations of Equity Funding. These investigations resulted in a trading halt of Equity Funding
and an impounding of its assets. The S.E.C. then brought an action for violation of Section 10(b)
against Dirks for repeating allegations of fraud to members of the investment community who later
sold their Equity Funding stocks. Id. at 648-51.
128. Id. at 663.
129. Id. at 662.
130. Id. at 665.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Even though the Supreme Court in Chiarella dictated that the se-
curities laws do not guarantee equal access to information, the decision
in S.E.C. v. Materia, which proscribed certain informational advantages,
is sensible on both a legal and a commonsensical basis. The elimination
and prevention of the type of profiteering engaged in by Materia lies at
the root of the federal securities regulations. By stepping away from pre-
viously used, ultrafine distinctions based on the relationship between
buyers and sellers of securities, the Materia decision firmly reinforces the
remedial goals of the securities laws as they were originally enacted.
Moreover, based on its prior decisions in Chiarella and Dirks, there is a
compelling indication that the current Supreme Court would place its
judicial stamp of approval on misappropriation as an actionable form of
fraud under Section 10(b). Although the Court refused to hear the
Materia case, when an "another day" finally comes, the Court will be
able to bring semblance to this novel theory of securities fraud.

